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Abstract 
The main objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of 
Financial Literacy (FL) and Frequency of Meetings(FM) of members 
of Audit Committee on financial reporting quality in Nigerian quoted 
companies. Data for the study were derived from annual reports of 
one hundred and thirty one (131) companies quoted on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange over the period of 2006 to 2012. The data were 
analyzed using descriptive, correlation and Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS). The multivariate regression technique was utilized to estimate 
our model. The findings showed that audit committee financial 
literacy and audit committee frequency of meetings had a positive 
significant influence on financial reporting quality. Based on these 
findings, some recommendations were made, prominent amongst 
them, was that, in order to strengthen the impact of financial literacy 
on financial reporting quality, regulatory authorities such as SEC, CBN 
and NDIC, should give special attention to audit committee members 
with high status with a view to making it mandatory for all companies 
to comply with it. Status, in this context, implies an aspect of personal 
power reflecting the ability to influence outcomes based on perceived 
skills, qualities and personal attributes.
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1. Introduction 
The major publicized cases of corporate financial frauds, accounting improprieties, 
scandals and failures in companies such as Cadbury Nigeria Plc in 2006, Afribank Nigeria 
Plc in 2009 and Intercontinental Bank Plc in 2009 have raised doubts about the credibility 
of the financial reporting quality of quoted companies in Nigeria. Issues of corporate 
insolvency in the financial sector immediately after the publication of unqualified 
financial statements by directors have recently attracted a lot of concern as to the real 
duties of directors and auditors. These developments have focused attention on the 
quality of reported financial statements and encouraged regulators and researchers to 
seek ways of improving the integrity and quality of the financial reporting process.   
The Audit Committee (AC) is a central element of one of such reforms that can enhance 
the quality of financial reporting through an open and candid communication and a good 
working relationship with a company’s board of directors, internal auditors and external 
auditors (Mustafa, 2012). Undeniably, the existence of an appropriately constituted audit 
committee is now a necessity for all listed companies in the United Kingdom and United 
States (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010; Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002) with corporate 
governance regulation placing significant importance on the role of AC. In Nigeria, the 
Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a code of Best Practices of Corporate 
Governance in S.11(a), which provides for the establishment of an audit committee in 
public companies in Nigeria. Therefore, there is a profound need to explore the features 
of an audit committee in the Nigerian context, the changing nature of its attributes and 
association of these attributes with the financial reporting process.   
In Nigeria, the creation and establishment of an audit committee is made mandatory by 
the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 2004. Section 359 (3) states, inter alia 
“The auditor shall in the case of a public company also make a report to an audit 
committee which shall be established by the public company”. According to CAMA 
Section359 (4), the make-up of the audit committee “shall consist of an equal number of 
directors and representatives of the shareholders of the company (subject to a maximum 
number of six members). The members are not entitled to any remuneration and shall be 
subject to re-election annually”. 
Besides the make-up of an audit committee, two attributes were adopted in this study to 
measure its impact on the financial reporting quality. They are: audit committee 
financial literacy and audit committee frequency of meetings. As a result of mixed 
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results associated with prior studies in developed countries, the aforementioned 
attributes were adopted with a view to finding out what the results would be if this study 
is carried out in Nigeria.  
A small number of studies existing in this area of research are output of developed 
countries which do not have similar regulative framework and government mechanisms 
to those of Nigeria. A few of them are the studies of Zhang and Zhou(2007), Bedard, 
Chtourou and Courtteay (2004), Defond, Hann and Hu (2005), Lin, Li and Yang (2006) and 
Yang and Krishnan(2005) whose results were mixed. For example, Zhang and Zhou(2007) 
used the number of meetings to measure whether the frequency influences financial 
reporting quality and they found a positive correlation while Bedard, Chtourou and 
Courtteay (2004) did not find any positive association between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and quality of  financial  reporting. Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) 
found a positive relationship between financial literacy   and financial  reporting quality  
while  Lin, Li and Yang (2006) and Yang  and  Krishnan (2005) did not find  any  significant  
association  among  accounting, financial  experts  and financial reporting quality. Besides,  
these  studies  documented inconclusive evidence  which  call  for an  investigation  into  
the  Nigerian scenario. This provides the justification and impetus for this study. The rest 
of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses  the  literature  review  and  
hypotheses development, Section 3 looks at the methodology, Section 4 focuses on the 
data presentation and analysis of results while Section 5 addresses conclusion and 
recommendations. 
1.1 Objectives of the Study 
The broad objective of the study was to determine the impact of Financial Literacy and 
Frequency of Meetings of members of Audit Committee on financial reporting quality. The 
specific objectives were to: 
  i.       ascertain the effect of financial literacy of audit committee members on financial                             
           reporting quality in Nigerian  companies ; 
ii.    determine the influence of frequency of audit committee meetings on financial 
reporting quality in Nigerian companies. 
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2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
Concept of  Financial Reporting Quality 
S.334 (2) of CAMA 2004 spelt out among others two basic financial statements, namely: 
Statement of Financial Position and Statement of Comprehensive Income. Also relevant 
are: Statement of Changes in Equity and Statement of Cash Flow. It is on the basis of the 
aforementioned statements that stakeholders are expected to make informed economic 
decisions. Financial statements can be adequately relied upon by their users where a 
structure of review and authorization are put in place to enhance the integrity of such a 
report (Okpala, 2012). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) stated 
that the structure should include a process that ensures the independence and 
competence of the external auditors and the audit committee that reviews and considers 
the financial statements, to enable the provision of confidence, reduction in uncertainty 
and risk and addition to value. The reliability and credibility of financial reports lie 
squarely on the shoulders of the board and its audit committee whose duty it is to ensure 
that internal control measures; accounting policies; and external auditors are in place in 
order to assure that financial statements are free from fraud. This becomes necessary, 
given the fact that there are proofs to indicate that the quality of financial reports has 
diminished over time (Lev & Zarowin, 1999). 
In order to ensure high quality financial reporting, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) identified in its framework for the preparation and presentation 
of financial statements four principal qualitative characteristics, namely: 
understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability.          
Users of financial statements include creditors, suppliers, customers, shareholders, 
lenders, employees, government agencies. These users have varying information needs 
.The quality of financial statements is of relevance to the needs for making reliable and 
informed decisions. Financial reporting embodies two types of information, namely: 
quantitative and non-quantifiable information. Both types of information are of immense 
importance to users of financial statements for decision making. It is to be noted that 
financial reporting quality and quality of financial reporting are used interchangeably.  
Several definitions of the term, financial reporting quality, have been expressed. For 
instance, financial reporting quality is defined as the exact manner by which it shows 
information as regards a business activity as it relates to its anticipated cash flows, with 
the aim of informing shareholders about a company’s operations (Verdi, 2006). Tang, 
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Chen and Zhijun (2008) defined financial reporting quality as the degree to which 
financial statements provide us with information that is fair and authentic about the 
financial position and performance of an enterprise. However, a commonly accepted 
definition is provided by Jonas and Blaurchet (2000) who asserted that quality of financial 
reporting is complete and unambiguous information that is not designed to misinform 
users. IASB (2006, 2008) opined that “the objective of financial reporting is to provide 
financial information about the reporting entity that is useful to present to potential 
equity investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as 
capital providers”(p.5).  
 Compliance with the objectives and qualitative attributes of financial reporting 
information as stated by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB,2006) will 
no doubt enhance financial reporting quality. The basic qualitative attributes of financial 
information are relevance and faithful representation (IASB, 2008). This study measured 
financial reporting quality using discretionary accruals derived from modified-Jones 1991 
model bearing in mind that financial reporting comprises both financial and non-financial 
information. Previous research revealed that Jones Model is frequently used to measure 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality (Balsam, Krishnan & Yang, 
2003; Chen & Lin, 2008; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Jackson, Moldrich & Roeback, 2008; 
Johnson, Khurana & Reynolds, 2002;and Myers & Omer, 2003). This model is shown in 
the section for methodology. The benefits of using discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
financial reporting quality are: it can be computed based on the financial information in 
the annual report and it is possible to evaluate the impact of company’s attributes on 
financial reporting quality (Healy&Wahlen,1999; Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney,1995).In 
addition, its use is consistent with empirical findings in prior research using other quality 
assessment tools ( Beest, Braam & Boelens,2009).In a nut shell, in a situation where 
managers use judgement in financial reporting to alter financial reports to mislead 
stakeholders, thereby negatively affecting the quality of financial reporting, discretionary 
accruals model as a measurement tool for financial reporting quality becomes desirable 
(Healy &Wahlem,1999). 
Audit Committee Meetings and Financial Reporting Quality   
Regulators and others have expressed a strong preference for an audit committee that 
meets frequently.  Audit committee meetings imply the number of times an audit 
committee member meets. This is quite different from attendance at meetings. Frequent 
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audit committee meetings allow for better communication between audit committee 
members and auditors (both external and internal) and enable the audit committee to be 
more effective [The Public Oversight Board ,1993, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Chairman, Levitt ,1999 & the Blue Ribbon Committee , 1999]. 
The number of audit committee meetings is considered to be an important attribute for 
monitoring effectiveness (Lin, Li & Yang, 2006). As a result, the audit committee that 
meets more frequently with the internal auditors is considered better informed about 
auditing and accounting issues. An audit committee that meets frequently can reduce the 
possibility of financial fraud (Abbott, Parker & Peters, 2004; Raghunadan, Rama & 
Scarbrough, 1998). Bryan, Liu and Tiras (2004) posited that audit committees that meet 
regularly are often expected to be able to perform monitoring tasks more effectively than 
others that do not meet regularly. Zhang and Zhou (2007) used the number of meetings 
to measure whether the frequency influences quality of financial reporting and they found 
a positive correlation. Inactive audit committees with less number of meetings are 
unlikely to supervise management effectively (Menon & Williams, 1994). Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000) found that fraudulent firms with earnings 
misstatements have fewer audit committee meetings than non-fraud firms. Hsu (2007) 
found that there is a positive relationship between audit committee meetings and a firm’s 
financial performance. When audit committees meet often, discretionary accruals are less 
and there is the possibility of a firm reporting more earnings, which shows a better 
financial reporting quality (Xie, et al, 2003 & Vafeas, 2005).        
However, empirical evidence on the impact of frequency of audit committee meeting on 
financial reporting quality differs. Bedard, Chtourou and Courtteay (2004) and Lin et al. 
(2006) did not find any positive association between the frequency of audit committee 
meetings and financial reporting quality.  
It follows therefore, an active audit committee with more meetings has more time to 
oversee the financial reporting process, identify management risk and monitor internal 
controls. Consequently, the quality of financial reporting tends to increase with an audit 
committee activity. Arising from the above, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1:  Frequency of audit committee meetings does not have significant influence      
       on  financial reporting quality. 
 
 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/2 (2016) 1-22 
7 
 
Audit Committee Financial Literacy and Financial Reporting Quality 
Financial Literacy is typically demonstrated by employment, experience or certification 
in accounting or finance (Price Water House Coopers/11A, 2000). The experience and 
knowledge in accounting and auditing related issues are considered as an important 
dimension for an audit committee. This advantage can help the audit committee members 
to be more conversant with financial and operational reports that will enable them to 
execute their oversight duties effectively (Matlain & Mazlina, 2005). 
It is generally accepted that the key duty of the audit committee is to review the financial 
reporting process to ensure the best quality. Thus, the availability of accounting and 
auditing expertise in the audit committee increases the efficiency of the audit committee’s 
performance. Regulators from various countries realize the importance of financial 
literacy in improving the audit committee’s effectiveness. They believe that the relevant 
experience or technical knowledge is crucial to effective accounting oversight (Kalbers & 
Fogarty, 1993). For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates that at least one 
member of the audit committee must be a financial expert. 
In the United Kingdom, the South Report (2003) echoed the views of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and specified that at least one audit committee member must have significant, recent 
and relevant financial expertise. In Nigeria, the Companies & Allied Matters Acts of 2004 
is silent as regards financial expertise. A number of studies have documented a negative 
association between the financial accounting literacy in the audit committee and earnings 
management (Bedard, Chtourou & Courtteau, 2004).Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin , 
Li,  and Yang (2006) did not find any significant relationship between financial literacy 
and financial reporting quality.   
Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) and Samuel (2012) found a positive relationship between 
financial literacy/financial expertise and financial reporting quality. Carcello, 
Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal (2006) asserted that there is a correlation between 
financial literacy and  financial reporting quality. Dhahival, Naiker and Navissi (2010) also 
observed a positive association between the financial literacy of audit committees and 
financial reporting quality. Xie et al (2003) found that audit committee members with 
accounting and financial knowledge are associated with companies that have smaller 
discretionary current accruals for financial reporting quality.  
Audit committees that have financial literacy have greater interaction with their internal 
auditors (Raghunadam, Read & Rama, 2004). Emeni (2009) evaluated the impact of audit 
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committee characteristics on financial reporting quality and found that there is a positive 
relationship between the financial reporting quality and financial literacy. In a nut shell, 
financially knowledgeable audit committee members who possess accounting 
qualifications are more likely to prevent and detect financial frauds. This necessitates the 
formation of the following hypothesis: 
H2:   Financial literacy of audit committee members has no significant effect 
       on financial reporting quality. 
Theoretical Framework  
The theoretical basis for this study is the agency theory which emanates from the 
relationship between the principal (owners) and the agent (managers). Audit committees 
primarily align the interests of owners with the management’s interest. The 
establishment of audit committees is regarded as a reaction to information asymmetrics 
between the owners of a company and its management ( Herzig & Watrin, 1995). Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) asserted that the primary objective of an audit committee is to resolve 
agency problems by monitoring management’s behaviour and inspecting the quality of 
financial reporting.  Consequently, enhancing audit committees will lead to an improved 
financial reporting quality. Emanating from this agency theory, independent variables 
were considered with a view to examining the impact of these explanatory variables 
(Audit committee financial literacy and Audit committee frequency of meetings) on 
financial reporting quality. 
3. Methodology 
Research Design and Source of data 
The study used the cross-sectional data design of companies listed in the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange over the period of 2006 to 2012 for the purpose of testing the hypotheses. 
A total of one hundred and ninety four (194) quoted companies constitute the population. 
The sample size consists of one hundred and thirty one (131) companies using Yaro 
Yamane formula. The choice of companies was based on availability of data in respect of 
companies in operation for seven consecutive years taking cognizance of sectoral 
representation of eleven (11) sectors of companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The study used secondary data derived from annual reports of one hundred 
and thirty one companies quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
Model Specification 
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Emanating from the extant literature,frequency of audit committee meetings is observed 
to have effect on the financial reporting quality( Zhang & Zhou,2000; Hsu,2007).Hence, 
the relationship between frequency of audit committee meetings and quality of financial 
reporting is expressed as:  
FRQ = f( ACFM)    ----------------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
In like manner, audit committee financial literacy was observed to impact on financial 
reporting quality (Defond,Hann &Hu,2005; Samuel,2012). As a result, the relationship 
between financial literacy and financial reporting quality is shown as: 
FRQ = f(ACFL)  ---------------------------------------------------------------------(2) 
Combining the two equations, we have 
FRQ = f(ACFM;ACFL)  -------------------------------------------------------------(3) 
Introducing two control variables of board diligence (BDDIL) and board size (BDSIZE), we 
have:  FRQ = f (ACFM; ACFL; BDDIL;BDSIZE)---------------------------------(4) 
In econometric form: 
DACCit= ∂0 + ∂1ACFMit + ∂2 ACFLit+ ∂3 BDDILit + ∂4BDSIZEit  + µit --------(5) 
Where: 
DACC  --------------------Discretionary Accruals(proxy for Financial Reporting Quality) 
ACFM --------------------Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
ACFL -------------------- Audit Committee Financial Literacy 
BDDIL  ------------------Board Diligence 
BDSIZE ------------------Board Size  
µit             ----------------Error term 
∂1---∂4    ----------------Unknown coefficients of the variables. It is expected as 
∂1-------∂4 < 0  
DACC (Discretionary Accruals) adopted from modified-Jones (1991) model is 
determined as the residual (difference) between TAC and NDAC shown as follows: 
DACi,t = [|TACi,t| / Ai,t-1] – |NDACi,t| …………………………………….. (eq.6) 
|TACi,t |/Ai, t - 1  = β1[|CFO|/Ai,t-1] + β2[(    Rev.i,t) /Ai, t-1] + β3[|PPEi,t |/Ai, t-1] + ei,t ... (eq. 7) 
NDACi,t = β0i[1/Ai,t-1] + β1i[(  Rev.i,t -    Rec.i,t)/Ai,t-1] + β2i[|PPEi,t|/Ai,t-1] + ei,t …(eq.8) 
Where:  TACi,t = TACi,t |/Ai, t - 1  = Total accrual of company i in year t; 
        Rev.i,t = Change in Revenues of company i between year t and t – 1; 
     Ai, t-1 = Total assets of company i at the end of year t – 1; 
     PPEi,t = Each company’s gross values of Property, Plant and equipment in  
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       year t – 1; 
    CFO = Cash Flow from operations for company i in year t; 
     ei,t   = Error term 
   NDACi,t = Non-discretionary accrual for company i  at time t; 
Reci,t = Change in account receivables (debtors) of company i, between year t and t – 1; 
The variables in the model are measured in Table I as follows: 
Table I  Operationalisation of Variables 
S/N Variables Definition Type Measureme
nt 
Authors 
1. FRQ  Financial 
Reporting 
Quality 
Dependent Discretionar
y Accruals 
Modified Jones, 
1991model. 
2. ACFM Audit 
Committee 
Frequency 
of Meetings 
Independent No. of Times 
Audit 
Committee 
meets in a 
Year 
Zhang  & 
Zhou,2007; 
Lin, Li & Yang, 
2006. 
3. ACFL Audit 
Committee 
Financial 
Literacy 
Independent No. of Audit 
Committee 
Members 
Kalters & Forgartry, 
1993 
4. BDDILI Board 
Diligence 
Independent(Contro
l) 
No. of 
meetings 
held by the 
Board 
Xie, Davidson & 
Dadalt, 2003. 
5. BDSIZE Board Size Independent(Contro
l) 
No. of 
Directors on 
the Board  
Thinggard & 
Kiertzner, 2008. 
Source: Author’s Compilation, 2015 
For one hundred and thirty one companies (131) observed, the variables were measured 
in relation to each company, covering a period of seven years (2006 to 2012).  
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4. Data Analysis and Presentation 
This section presents in detail, descriptive statistics, pearson correlation and ordinary 
least square regression. 
Table II presents the result of the descriptive statistics of the variables as follows: 
Table II: Descriptive Statistics  
     Source: Author’s Compilation (2015)  
Where; DACC= Discretionary accruals 
ACFL= Audit committee financial literacy  
ACFM= Audit committee frequency of meetings 
BDDIL=Board Diligence 
BDSIZE=Board size 
As observed in Table II, DACC had a mean value of 2.64E-07 which suggested minimal 
DACC value for sample with maximum and minimum values of 0.00496 and -0.003 
respectively and this is similar to results obtained by Okolie (2013).The standard 
deviation  suggested that the DACC values across the companies exhibited considerable 
clustering around the mean. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 660154.2 alongside its p-value 
(p=0.00<0.05) indicated that the data satisfied normality and as well as the unlikelihood 
of outliers in the series. ACFL was observed to have a mean value of 1.4 with maximum 
and minimum values of 4 and 0 respectively. The standard deviation of 1.149 suggested a 
considerable cluster around the mean for the sample. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 27.58 
alongside its p-value (p=0.00<0.05) indicated that the data satisfied normality as well as 
the unlikelihood of outliers in the series. The mean for ACFM is 3.497 with maximum and 
minimum values of 12 and 1 respectively. The standard deviation of 1.035 suggested a 
considerable cluster around the average. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 2483 alongside its 
p-value (p=0.00<0.05) indicated that the data satisfied normality. The statistics is higher 
 DACC ACFL ACFM BDDIL BDSIZE 
 Mean 2.64E-07 1.4 3.4971 4.3853 9.5794 
 Median -3.19E-05 1 4 4 10 
 Max 0.004968 4 12 9 18 
 Min -0.00026 0 1 2 5 
 Std. Dev. 0.000304 1.149 1.0348 0.8999 2.4391 
 Jarque-Bera 660154.2 27.58 2483 242.55 16.918 
 Probability 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0002 
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than that of Saudi quoted firms (mean=2.9 min=2, max=7), for New-Zealand (mean=2.44, 
min=0.00, max=12) (Rani, 2011) and lower in maximum values for Australian quoted 
firms (mean=3 min=0, max=15) (Al-Lehaidan 2006). The mean for BDDIL measured by 
the number of board meetings is 4.385 with maximum and minimum values of 9 and 2 
respectively. The standard deviation of 0.899 with a Jacque-Bera statistic of 242.55 
alongside its p-value (0.00) indicated that the data satisfied normality. BDSIZE had a 
mean value of 9.5794 with maximum and minimum values of 18 and 5 respectively.The 
spread of the data around the mean is 2.4391 which suggested a considerable cluster 
around the average. The Jacque-Bera statistic of 16.918 alongside its p-value (p=0.0002 < 
0.05) indicated that the data satisfied normality.  
Table III examines the correlation coefficients of the variables. 
Table III: Pearson Correlation Statistics 
 DACC ACFL ACFM BDDIL BDSIZE 
DACC      
ACFL 
 
-0.03 1    
ACFM 
 
0.017 -0.108 1   
BDDIL 
 
-0.053 -0.189 0.1263 1  
BDSIZE 
 
0.001 -0.126 0.1287 0.131
8 
1 
Source: Author’s Compilation (2015) 
As observed in Table III, a negative correlation existed between DACC and ACFL(r=-0.03). 
Though the coefficient was weak, the direction of association suggested that audit 
committee financial literacy tended to decrease the DACC and hence improve financial 
reporting quality. A similar observation was identified by Baxter (2007) for Australian 
quoted companies with a coefficient (r=-0.020) though quite different from that found by 
Sherliza and Nuru (2012) (r=0.093) for Malaysian quoted companies. A positive 
correlation was also observed between DACC and ACFM (r=0.017). Though weak, the 
correlation suggested that ACFM might not be associated with a decline in DACC. DACC 
appeared to correlate positively with BDSIZE (r=0.001) and negatively with BDDIL(r=-
0.053). 
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Table IV shows the regression assumptions test for the model. 
Table IV Regression Assumptions Test  
Multicollinearity test:  Variance Inflation factor 
Variable Coefficient 
Variance 
Centered  VIF 
C 473.1977 NA 
ACFL 3.78785 1.279933 
ACFM 3.771958 1.319219 
BDDIL 4.130693 1.162812 
BDSIZE 0.74157 1.754793 
Heteroskedasticity Test: ARCH 
F-statistic = 0.12504 Prob. F(1,45) 0.7253 
Obs*R-squared = 1302 Prob.Chi-
Square(1) 0.7182 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic = 0.12504 Prob. F(2,34) 0.3939 
Obs*R-squared=2.559647 Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 0.2781 
Ramsey Reset Test 
t- statistics=1.2948 Df= 92 0.1986 
f-statistics =1.676 Prob. F(1,92) 0.1986 
 Source: Researcher’s Compilation (2015) 
 As observed in Table IV, the variance inflation factor (VIF) shows how much of the 
variance of a coefficient estimate of a regressor has been inflated due to collinearity with 
the other regressors. Basically, VIFs above 10 are seen as a cause for concern (Landau and 
Everitt, 2003).As observed, none of the variables had VIF’s values exceeding 10 and hence 
none gave a serious indication of multicollinearity. The ARCH test for heteroscedasticity 
was performed on the residuals as a precaution.  The results showed probabilities in 
excess of 0.05, which led one to reject the presence of heteroscedasticity in the residuals. 
The Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for higher order autocorrelation revealed that the 
hypotheses of zero autocorrelation in the residuals were not rejected. This was because 
the probabilities (Prob. F, Prob. Chi-Square) were greater than 0.05.  The LM test did not, 
therefore, reveal serial correlation problems for the model. The performance of the 
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Ramsey RESET test showed high probability values that were greater than 0.05, meaning 
that there was no significant evidence of miss-specification. 
Regression Result 
Table V shows the empirical result of the effect of audit committee financial literacy and 
audit committee frequency of meetings on quality of financial reporting. 
Table V: Regression Result 
 2006 2006 2006 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 
C 0.725 
(1.927) 
{0.708} 
-0.625 
(1.927) 
{0.921} 
- 49.691 
(22.749) 
{0.035} 
0.167  
(0.711) 
{0.815} 
-1.978 
(0.699) 
{0.399}             
-16.047 
(8.418) 
{0.065} 
0.002 
(0.064)  
{0.972} 
-0.625 
(6.233)  
{0.921} 
-0.030 
(0.788)  
{0.983} 
ACFL -1.450 
(1.723) 
{0.034} 
 
 
 
-2.3888 
(1.685) 
{0.165} 
-0.3422 
(0.643) 
{0.041} 
 -0.115 
(0.768) 
{0.032} 
-0.002 
(0.066) 
{0.049} 
 
 
-0.002 
(0.073) 
{0.984} 
 ACFM  
 
-0.1886 
(0.181) 
{0.017} 
-0.8728 
(1.804) 
{0.631} 
 -0.595 
(2.804) 
{0.023} 
0.774 
(0.754) 
{0.042} 
 
 
-0.0252 
(0.079) 
{0.034} 
0.0259 
(0.090) 
{0.775} 
BDSIZ   
 
 
-2.266 
(1.285) 
{0.085} 
 
 
 0.385 
(0.338) 
{0.263} 
  -0.002 
(0.066) 
{0.973} 
BDDIL  
 
 
 
-2.266 
(1.285) 
{0.085} 
 
 
 -1.935 
(0.827) 
{0.026} 
  -0.002 
(0.066) 
{0.973} 
R2 0.5 0.523 0.542 0.530 0.514 0.562 0.570 0.554 0.570 
F-Stat 3.708 2.017 4.744 3.708 2.621 2.039 2.621  2.174 0.585 
P(f-stat) 0.034 0.017 0.00 0.031  0.034 0.057   0.042 0.044 0.821 
D.W 1.9 2..00 2..00 1.9 1.91 2.00 1.91 2.00 1.99 
 2009 2009 2009 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 
C 0.725 
9.064 
{1.927) 
-0.448 
(1.333) 
{0.002} 
-0.503 
(0.574) 
{0.386} 
-1.643 
(3.702) 
(0.659) 
-0.093 
(0.702) 
{0.895} 
1.849 
(4.527) 
{0.685} 
0.035 
(0.351) 
{0.920} 
-0.599 
(1.394)  
{0.631} 
19.951 
(6.275)  
{0.003} 
ACFL -1.450 
(1.723) 
{0.044} 
 
 
 
-0.0452 
(0.042) 
{0.290} 
-0.189 
(0.262) 
{0.039} 
 
 
 
-0.165 
(0.288) 
{0.571} 
-0.058 
(0.372) 
{0.045} 
 -0.090 
(0.343) 
{0.794} 
ACFM  
 
-0.129 
(0.036) 
{0.000} 
-0.138 
(0.042) 
{0.000} 
 
 
-0.026 
(0.178) 
{0.032} 
0.0221 
(0.196) 
{0.910} 
 -0.1919 
(0.039) 
{0.043} 
0.600 
(1.304) 
{0.000} 
BDSIZ   
 
 
-0.0172 
(0.018) 
{0.368} 
 
 
 
 
-0.0826 
(0.1851) 
{0.6579} 
  0.0172 
(0.018) 
{0.368} 
BDDIL  
 
 
 
-0.1618 
(0.058) 
 
 
 -0.3169 
(0.4163) 
  -0.1618 
(0.039) 
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{0.009}  {0.4514} {0.522} 
R2 0.580 0.590 0.574 0.510 0.540 0.56 0.521  0.53 0.57 
F-Stat 2.198 4.61 2.199 3.708 2.021 0.706 2.422 2.561 5.199 
P(f-stat) 0.044 0.003 0.033 0.026 0.041 0.591   0.038 0.031 0.003 
D.W 2.1 2.1 1.8 1.9 2.00   2.03 2.0 2.00 2.00 
 2012 2012 2012       
C 0.0389 
(2.150) 
{0.857} 
-3.846 
(7.627) 
{0.601} 
-48.350 
(53.847) 
{0.185} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
ACFL -0.763 
(0.193) 
{0.024} 
 
 
 
-0.1029 
(2.160) 
{0.636} 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
AUDFM  
 
-1.073 
(0.526) 
{0.014} 
-1.2522 
(2.126) 
{0.636} 
 
 
 
  
 
   
BDSIZ   
 
 
0.0172 
(0.0188) 
{0.368} 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
BDDIL  
 
 
 
-0.1618 
(0.058) 
{0.009} 
 
 
 
     
 
R2 0.552 0.542 0.58       
F-Stat 2.156 6.61 2.199       
P(f-stat) 0.042 0.00 0.033       
D.W 2.1 2.0 2.03       
Source: Author’s Compilation (2015) * sig at 5%, ** sig at 10% n.b: ( ) standard error { } 
p-values  
For 2006, evaluating the individual effect of the variables, we observed that Audit 
Committee Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained about 50% of systematic changes in 
quality of financial reporting. The coefficient was negative (-1.450) in line with the 
predicted sign and significant (p=0.034) at 10% level. The F-stat (3.708) and p-value 
(0.034) indicated that the null hypothesis which states that Audit committee financial 
literacy has no significant influence on  quality of financial reporting was rejected at 10% 
level while the D. W statistics of 1.9 indicated the absence of serial correlation of the 
residuals in the model. The negative coefficient of -1.450 implies that there was an 
increase in audit committee financial literacy which resulted in a decline in discretionary 
accruals and thus improved (i.e .increase) the quality of financial reporting. .Audit 
committee frequency of meetings accounted for about 52% of systematic changes in 
quality of financial reporting. The coefficient was negative (-0.1886) and significant 
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(p=0.017) at 5% level. The F-stat (2.017) and p-value (0.017) did not support the null 
hypothesis of no significant influence of Audit committee frequency of meetings on quality 
of financial reporting while the D. W statistics of 2.0 indicated the absence of serial 
correlation of the residuals in the model. The implication of the negative coefficient of -
0.1886 is that there was an increase in audit committee frequency of meetings which 
resulted in a decline in discretionary accruals and thus an increase in the quality of 
financial reporting. For 2007, Audit Committee Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained about 
53% of systematic changes in quality of financial reporting. The coefficient was negative 
(-0.342) but significant (p=0.041) at 5% level. The F-stat (3.708) and p-value (0.031) 
indicated that the null hypothesis of no significant effect of ACFL on quality of financial 
reporting was rejected at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 1.9 indicated the absence of 
serial correlation of the residuals in the model. Audit Committee Frequency of Meetings 
(ACFM) accounted for an impressive 51% of systematic changes in quality of financial 
reporting. The coefficient was negative (-0.595) and significant (p=0.023) at 5% level. The 
F-stat (2.621) and p-value (0.034) did not support the null hypothesis of no significant 
influence of ACFM on quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 
1.9 indicated the absence of serial correlation of the residuals in the model. For 2008, 
Audit Committee Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained about 57% of systematic changes in 
quality of financial reporting as against 50% and 53% observed in 2006 and 2007 
respectively. The coefficient was negative (-0.002) but significant (p=0.049) at 5% level. 
The F-stat (2.621) and p-value (0.042) did not support the hypothesis of no significant 
effect of ACFL on quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 2.00 
indicated the absence of serial correlation of the residuals in the model. Audit Committee 
Frequency of Meetings (ACFM) accounted for an impressive 57% of systematic changes 
in quality of financial reporting. The coefficient was negative (-0.025) and significant 
(p=0.034) at 5% level. The F-stat (2.174) and p-value (0.044) did not support the null 
hypothesis of no significant linear relationship at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 2.00 
indicated the absence of serial correlation of the residuals in the model. For 2009, Audit 
Committee Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained about 58% of systematic changes in  
quality of  financial reporting as against 57% in 2008 and 50% observed in 2006 and 53% 
in 2007. The coefficient was negative (-1.450) but significant (p=0.044) at 5% level. The 
F-stat (2.198) and p-value (0.044) did not support the hypothesis of no significant effect 
of ACFL on quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 1.9 
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indicated the absence of serial correlation of the residuals in the model. Audit Committee 
Frequency of Meetings (ACFM) accounted for 59% of systematic changes in quality of 
financial reporting in 2009. The coefficient was negative (-0.129) in line with the 
predicted sign and significant (p=0.00) at 5% level. The F-stat (4.61) and p-value (0.003) 
did not support the null hypothesis of no significant effect of ACFM on quality of financial 
reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 2.00 indicated the absence of serial 
correlation of the residuals in the model. For 2010, Audit Committee Financial Literacy 
(ACFL) explained about 51% of systematic changes in quality of financial reporting. The 
coefficient was negative(-0.189) but significant (p=0.039) at 5% level .The F-stat(3.708) 
and p-value(0.026) did not support the hypothesis of null significant impact of ACFL on  
quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D.W statistics of 1.9 indicated the 
absence of a serial correlation of the residuals in the model. Audit committee frequency 
of meetings (AUDFM) accounted for about 54% of systematic changes in the quality of 
financial reporting in 2010. The coefficient was negative (-0.026) and significant 
(p=0.039) at 5% level. The F-stat (2.021) and p-value (0.041) did not support the null 
hypothesis of no significant influence of ACFM on quality of financial reporting at 5% level 
in 2010 while the D. W statistics of 2.00 indicated the absence of serial correlation of the 
residuals in the model. For 2011, Audit Committee Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained 
about 52% of systematic changes in quality of financial reporting. The coefficient was 
negative (-0.058) but significant (p=0.045) at 5% level. The F-stat (2.422) and p-value 
(0.038) did not support the null hypothesis of no significant impact of ACFL on quality of 
financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 2.0 indicated the absence of 
serial correlation of the residuals in the model. Audit committee frequency of meetings 
accounted for 53% of systematic changes in quality of financial reporting. The coefficient 
was negative (-0.191) and significant (p=0.043) at 5% level. The F-stat (2.561) and p-
value (0.031) failed to support the null hypothesis of a no significant influence of ACFM 
on quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W statistics of 2.00 indicated the 
absence of serial correlation of the residuals in the model. For 2012, Audit Committee 
Financial Literacy (ACFL) explained about 55% of systematic changes in quality of 
financial reporting. The coefficient was negative (-0.763) but significant (p=0.024) at 5% 
level. The F-stat (2.156) and p-value (0.042) did not support the null hypothesis of no 
significant impact of ACFL on financial reporting quality at 5% level while the D. W 
statistics of 2.1 indicated the absence of a serial correlation of the residuals in the model. 
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Audit committee frequency of meeting accounted for 54% of systematic changes in quality 
of financial reporting. The coefficient was negative (1.073) though significant (p=0.601) 
at 5% level. The F-stat (6.61) and p-value (0.00) did not support the null hypothesis of no 
significant effect of ACFL on quality of financial reporting at 5% level while the D. W 
statistics of 2.00 indicated the absence of a serial correlation of the residuals in the model.  
5.  Conclusion and Recommendations  
The study postulates, in line with prior studies, based on agency theoretical framework 
that audit committee can impact significantly, constrain accrual-based distortion of 
quality of financial reporting credibility and thus improve the quality of financial 
reporting. To buttress this argument, audit committee financial literacy and audit 
committee frequency of meetings were regressed on discretionary accruals used as proxy 
for quality of financial reporting while board diligence and board size as control variables. 
The findings of the study suggest that audit committee financial literacy and audit 
committee frequency of meetings are important attributes that significantly determined 
the level of financial reporting quality in Nigerian quoted companies as both audit 
committee financial literacy and audit committee frequency of meetings had positive 
statistical significant impact on quality of financial reporting in Nigerian quoted 
companies. 
Arising from the findings, are the following recommendations:                                                                                                                                                             
There is the need for trainings and seminars to be organized for members of audit 
committee by regulatory authorities such as Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) as 
obtainable in other developed countries where audit committee institutions are 
established to train members of audit committee. This will enable members keep abreast 
of up to date information as regards their roles and responsibilities which will make them 
more effective and efficient in their assignments. 
Importantly also, the Securities and Exchange Commission  and the Central Bank of 
Nigeria should put in place a regulation which ensures that audit committee members 
maintain at least an attendance rate of 85% for them to be retained in the audit committee 
for the following financial year. The practice where audit committee members are simply 
there just to complete the audit committee size without active attendance and 
participation at meetings should be curtailed. 
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Lastly, it is suggested that regulatory authorities such as SEC, CBN and NDIC should give 
special attention to audit committee members with high status with a view to making it 
mandatory for all companies to comply with it bearing in mind that while financial literacy 
provides the knowledge necessary to improve quality of financial reporting, it may not be 
sufficient by itself to effectively reduce accounting irregularities. Status, in this context, 
implies an aspect of personal power reflecting the ability to influence outcomes based on 
perceived skills, qualities and personal attributes. 
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